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## Great Britain Goes Socialist

BY HAROLD J. LASKI

*London, July 27 (by cable)*

THE Labor Party has come to power. It has won 390 seats at least. It has majority of not less than 130 over the whole House of Commons. It has defeated 26 of Mr. Churchill's ministers, including men like L. S. Amery, Sir James Grigg, and Mr. Brendan Bracken. The Liberal Party has been massacred: its leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, and its special aces, Sir William Beveridge and Lady Violet Bonham-Carter, were both defeated. So were Mr. Churchill's son and his son-in-law, Mr. Duncan Sandys, the Minister of Works. The left got fifteen million votes as against ten million votes for the right. Mr. Churchill, who will not return to Potsdam, resigned last night, and Mr. Attlee accepted the King's commission to form the first Labor government with a majority in the history of Great Britain. On any showing, this an epoch in our lives, perhaps an epoch in the life of the world.

Why did it occur? Why was Mr. Churchill, who two months ago seemed at the pinnacle of power, to find it taken from him by the massive and deliberate decision of the people?

The answer, I think, is threefold. First, there was widespread resentment at Mr. Churchill's effort to make this election a vote of personal confidence in himself. That seemed a *Führerprinzip*, a claim to indispensability which is out of harmony with the essential principles of democratic government. Second, I think I may fairly say that there was widespread disgust at the way in which Mr. Churchill allowed himself to become the instrument of Lord Beaverbrook's stunts and scares. It showed a febrile irresponsibility, if I may venture a personal word, to paint an inoffensive scholar like myself as the head of the Socialist Gestapo. Thirdly, no one believed that the vested interests behind Mr. Churchill had any serious convictions about the large-scale programs of social reform he announced. Everyone knew that they wanted to get back to normalcy as rapidly as possible. Finally, Mr. Churchill never understood—an amazing index to his mind—that with the fighting man no less than the civilian he was dealing with people who had been thinking hard for five years and were determined to be done, once and for all, with the old order.

The Labor Party in the new House of Commons will be the best party we have ever had. It is fully representative of most areas, geographical and functional—the cathedral city

as well as the mining village, Tory strongholds like Dover as well as business symbols like the exchange divisions of Manchester and Liverpool. It has broken the Chamberlain tradition in Birmingham. It has an overwhelming majority in London and its suburban areas. It has won a goodly number of rural seats, its first big triumph in the countryside. Professors, lawyers, doctors, school teachers, journalists, business men, trade-union organizers, and trade unionists from the assembly line—all these have their due meed of representation. Above all, and to me best of all, it is a young party and the youth is contributed by the service candidates, rank and file as well as officers, among whom I am certain that I could name confidently at least three as the leaders of the Labor Party in the next generation.

It is a grim task upon which the Labor government embarks. First, it has to give all its energy and aid to the swift and decisive defeat of Japan. Simultaneously it must employ all its powers to evoke a new sense of hope in Europe and, out of that evocation, to make the unity of the three great powers real and unbreakable. It must end the era of support for obsolete monarchs in exile and decayed systems of privilege which have been accustomed to look to Downing Street for support. It must press forward with genuine determination to Indian freedom. It must make that pan-Arabism, so carefully cultured since 1939, understand decisively that the tragic remnant of European Jewry will not be sacrificed to make a holiday for Arab effendi in any part of the Middle East. It must give to France, yes, and to re-ascendant Italy, the kind of friendship which gives power to their creative genius. It must use its new influence to rebuild the unity of the working-class movement all over the world. Is it too much to hope that we may look for active support from America? For there innumerable men and women organized the greatest campaign in the history of the nation to eliminate insecurity and fear and give new status to the underprivileged. Nor did the objectives of the New Deal stop at national boundaries. The vision of Franklin D. Roosevelt included a world in which the Four Freedoms had become a reality. The foreign policy of the Labor Government points toward such a goal; its fulfillment will require the active cooperation of the liberal and working-class movement of America.

On the domestic side the problems are also immense. We have at once to try and build the foundations of socialism

within the structure of a society dominated by a capitalist economy, and to carry through those immediate measures like housing, the orderly demobilization of the fighting men, the reorganization for peace of the war-time economic controls which touch every phase of our national life. It will not be easy once the first excitement has died down. Privilege in Britain is strong. It has the psychological tenacity of a group of men accustomed to the habit of power. There will be relentless opposition on every inch of the road. Victory will depend upon the courage and audacity of the new Cabinet. This is not a time for half measures. It is not a time for doubt. It is a time to go forward boldly and to show in deeds the actual faith of the party in its principles. That is the way to overcome the persistent efforts the City will make, as did Wall Street with Roosevelt, to render the path a hard one. That is the way also to keep the House of Lords in its place. I think there is a real chance of this. As the country has moved left, so the party has moved left. Also there is a strong following in the new members for the policy of great experiment, boldly conceived and skilfully and resolutely exercised. This is to be a socialist government. It is by being socialist that it will hold the public opinion it has won.

The American who seeks to understand this election must compare it with the historic victory of the Whigs in 1832. After long years of reaction, the old aristocratic Toryism was compelled to give way before the advance of the middle class. The structure of bourgeois democracy was built into the foundations on which the superstructure of aristocratic privilege had been erected. In the election of 1945 the Fourth Estate, the common people, have opened the barriers which shut them out from their right to power. The Labor Party in their name will seek to make a revolution by consent. It will try to build the socialist commonwealth for the creation of which it has a decisive mandate by the processes of constitutional democracy. That ought to be possible. I hope it will be possible. But I think of the fate of the Weimar Republic, of Italy handed to Mussolini by vested interests, of Spanish democracy slain without protest from those who should have been its friends, of Austria gobbled up by Hitler while democracy in Europe and America pretended that it was not their concern. Where the rights of property are concerned, its owners lose all sense of reason and justice in their passion to make the state power the servant of their right to exploit the masses of people.

Will it be different this time? I do not know. Much depends on the courage of the Labor government. It is still true, as Pericles said, that courage is the secret of freedom. Much depends on its ability at home to make this great adventure a great training of the people in the knowledge of their power. Much depends abroad on the eagerness and the speed with which the government evokes all over Europe the half-awakened forces of democracy. They are there, waiting for the encouragement which would give them the right to cooperate with this new Britain with all their strength. There is the Soviet Union, which could, and I think will, draw the inference from the Labor party's victory that a great bastion of its military security has been gained on which a stronger friendship between our peoples can be built. There is India, with whom we can hope to write a new chapter in our common destiny.

The chance is there. The faith is there. We must organize behind them will and determination so that, out of the horror of this war, there may come—if slowly, nevertheless surely—a renovation of the human spirit which will turn it toward creativeness and plenty instead of toward destruction and suffering. This is a day, indeed, to echo the famous sentence, "We have nothing to lose but our chains and a world to win."

Let us go forward to the fulfilment of emancipation. If it is wise for us to be humble, it is not less wise for us to remember that destiny has given us a supreme opportunity.

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# The Shape of Things

THERE WERE NO DARK HORSES AMONG THOSE named by Mr. Attlee for leading positions in the new British government before he left for Potsdam. Bevin, Morrison, Cripps, Greenwood, Dalton are men of the highest standing in the Labor Party and its most experienced administrators. But in matching men with offices the Prime Minister confounded some of the prophets. True, the appointment of Ernest Bevin as Foreign Minister was generally expected; his speech at the Blackpool Labor Conference in May was a frank bid for the position. From the point of view of the striped-trousers school of diplomacy the choice of this burly, plain-spoken trade-union leader is incongruous to say the least. Let them recall how admirably Arthur Henderson, another trade-union leader, filled this office in the last Labor government. Mr. Ernest Bevin is as British as Winston Churchill, but, unlike him, internationally minded. He has excelled as a negotiator in the hard school of industrial relations, he will not be intimidated by anyone, and he will certainly not become the Charlie McCarthy of his permanent officials. Herbert Morrison, with his drive, his administrative ability, and his understanding of economics, had been considered a natural for the treasury. Instead he becomes Lord President of the Council, an office without specific administrative responsibilities, and Leader of the House of Commons. This means he will be charged with pushing the government's legislative program through Parliament, a task to which, as a skilled political strategist and a keen debater, he is well suited. With Morrison otherwise engaged, Hugh Dalton, one of the party's chief economic experts, had a clear path to the Treasury. The selection of Sir Stafford Cripps, however, as President of the Board of Trade, has been a surprise. In our view it is an excellent choice. This is a key position in the reconstruction of trade and industry, and no one has a firmer grasp than Cripps of the nature of the problems to be solved.

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BIG BUSINESS IN BRITAIN IS STUNNED BY THE Tory defeat but, when it comes to, it will surely seek to nullify the verdict of the polls. It has lost its grip on the machinery of the state but economic power will afford it many opportunities to delay, block, and sabotage Labor's program. In such activities British business can count on the sympathy of American business men and, if we allow it, their positive aid. Already Arthur Krock has portentously declared in the *New York Times* that "our foreign economic policy must be resurveyed" in the light of British Labor's proposals to nationalize certain industries and "to engage in a highly expensive program of public housing and social security." (The very large Conservative pledges on this score appear to have escaped his notice; or, perhaps, he did not take them seriously.) Fearing that Labor's program may produce "a demoralized British economy," Mr. Krock says the United States must watch its commitments; "it should not underwrite State Socialism." He then quotes with approval Mr. Baruch's advocacy of measures to safeguard

America against foreign socialization schemes, the promotion of cartels, and "the undercutting of human standards." This is confusing. It is the British Conservatives who have fostered international cartels, and Labor is far more likely to cooperate with the United States in their suppression. Nor do we see a British Labor Government "cutting human standards": that surely is a trick of private enterprise. Nevertheless the drift of the Krock-Baruch thinking is clear enough: to protect the American "system" our financial and economic power must be used to thwart socialism abroad. We submit that in this day and age such a doctrine is political dynamite.

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THE TESTIMONY OF THE CHIEF WITNESSES IN the trial of Marshal Pétain has been largely a defense of their records. Pétain indeed has come to seem like a lay figure—and his stony silence reinforces the impression. Whatever prestige he had left, even upon his return to France, seems to have melted away; it is significant that whereas in a poll of French opinion last September only 3 per cent wanted him to suffer the death penalty, in May of this year the figure has risen to 40 per cent. As man and marshal of France, Pétain is finished, whatever the verdict may be. The main interest of his trial lies in the fact that it has turned into a wide-ranging examination of the reasons for the French disaster. And the examination is going on outside the court as well. Francois Mauriac, writing in *Figaro*, asserts, for instance, that not only Daladier but everyone in France and elsewhere who applauded the Munich pact must accept a share of guilt.

Pétain [he writes] has assumed before God and man responsibilities of which nobody can relieve him. But we should be hypocrites if, before joining our voices with all who accuse him, each of us did not ask himself: "What did I do or write or think at the time of Munich? In what mood did I greet the armistice?"

Pétain's trial has thrown into bold relief the outlines of the civil war that was going on in France long before the outbreak of the war between the nations in 1939 and is now moving into its decisive phase. M. Mauriac's excoriation is just, but we hope the thesis that "we are all guilty" will not be carried too far. The civil war is still on. It must end not in an amnesty to misguided leaders and vicious tendencies on the ground that they stopped short of treachery, but in a clear decision—and a clean sweep of French reaction, of which Pétain was only one of the uglier manifestations.

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THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE POTSDAM Conference will include, we hope, a definite announcement on reparations, which have been the subject of some disturbing rumors. According to one report agreement was reached at Yalta for splitting a total of \$20 billion to be extracted from Germany within five years. Russia was to get half this amount, the United States and Britain \$4 billion each, while "the lesser victims" would share the remaining \$2 billion. Such a division, it seems to us, is based on power rather than equity. Actually no reparations within

Germany's capacity to pay can begin to compensate for the devastation the Nazis have left behind them. But whatever payments are forthcoming should be allotted to injured countries in proportion to their losses. On this basis Russia would certainly rank for the biggest share—perhaps even as much as 50 per cent—but that share ought to include whatever German goods are being carried off by the Russians from their occupation zone in advance of a reparations agreement. According to reports from Paris, Moscow regards this booty as outside the general reparations pool. Such rumors are disturbing the French, excluded as they are from Potsdam, but they are likely to be even more disturbed by stories from several sources suggesting that the grand total of reparations will in the first place be distributed among the Big Three, each of which will retrocede some part to smaller nations. We trust that this report will prove entirely without foundation, for distribution on such a basis would be truly monstrous. It would place at the disposal of the big powers an enormous patronage fund with which countries pursuing policies approved by the patron would be rewarded while those that kicked over the traces would be punished. It could become a means for supporting, say, a conservative government in France or for disciplining a radical one. Justice demands that Germany's victims receive reparations as a right, not as a favor granted by one or other or all of the Big Three.

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THE DICTATORS OF ONE OF THE UNITED Nations, Argentina, came a cropper when they launched a vilification campaign against American Ambassador Spruille Braden. In answer to the government-inspired attack on Mr. Braden, several thousand Argentines accorded him a spontaneous ovation in which shouts of "Viva Braden! Vivan los Estados Unidos! Libertad! Democracia!" filled the air. A statement signed by 362 prominent Argentines has protested the government's anti-Braden campaign. Apparently neither the repressions of their own dictator nor the recognition given him by our State Department have weakened the Argentine people's determination to get rid of Perón and restore democratic institutions. That day is not far off, as the recent action of the moderate Radical Party, Argentina's most powerful political organization, indicates. It has surmounted earlier threats of a split and stated its united and unequivocal opposition to the Perón regime, which had long sought its support. Any of its members who accepts office in the present government or collaborates with it in any way will automatically be eliminated from the party. In addition, it has called for free elections, freedom of the press, and a lifting of the state of siege. The students' strike and opposition statements issued by business men and livestock producers show that the anti-Perón wave is no longer restricted to labor, leftist, and professional groups, but includes all sections of the population. The campaign against Braden has provided an opportunity to reopen the Argentine issue.

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THE PROCESS WE FORESAW WHEN TRUMAN inherited the Presidency is now clearly under way, only it is happening even faster than we expected. One by one the Roosevelt men are being replaced. Their resignations

are being accepted without protest although with courteous "regret." Their jobs are going to persons not so very different in point of view but different enough to indicate a direction. The direction is to the right. We predict that this process will be speeded up as the 1946 elections draw near. Mr. Hannegan will want men at the head of departments and agencies who will appreciate the need of providing good jobs for good Democrats down below. But there is one impending change that ought to be prevented at all costs. Secretary Ickes should not be permitted to retire from the Department of the Interior. That he is planning to quit as soon as Mr. Truman gets back from Potsdam is generally assumed. And friends of Mr. Ickes say that the President is ready to let him go. If as good a man were available for the job we would not protest Mr. Ickes's resignation, for the Secretary is the last remaining indigenous New Dealer and he has earned a furlough. So far no appropriate successor has been suggested, and the danger is that the post will go to a political appointee. This would be a calamity; nothing less. For the Interior Department has under its heterogeneous jurisdiction such immense national assets as the great river developments—save only the TVA—and the federal oil lands. There is just one way to make sure these resources are protected and exploited for the benefit of the people as a whole, and that is by keeping the Secretaryship out of the hands of the politicians. Mr. Ickes should stay where he is until he is certain that his job will go to a man who can be trusted to stand off the private oil and power interests.

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THE RAIL JOURNEY HOME FOR RETURNING veterans has the elements of a nightmare postscript to their combat experiences. According to one reporter they reach the end of their trip "looking a good deal like Bill Mauldin's Willie and Joe." It should not be so. Of course, with the roads carrying five times the passengers carried before the war, conditions are bound to be difficult. But planning would have avoided much of the present jam. As long ago as December, 1943, the Truman committee warned that failure to provide for the "replenishment needs of transportation agencies in terms of manpower, materials, and facilities . . . would be to run the risk of a breakdown." Nothing important was done, and today, at the very moment when troops are being deployed for a final blow against Japan, "manpower, materials, and facilities" are all lacking. Short-term planning has been even more neglected. The testimony of J. Monroe Johnson, Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, before the Mead War Investigation Committee, placed the blame fairly on the army. No inkling of the redeployment program was given out until early in May, it was revised toward the end of May, and in the months of June and July the actual arrival of troops exceeded by 50,000 and 97,000 the army's estimates. The redeployment program calls for moving 2,000,000 troops home within ten months. Clearly certain steps are needed. (1) There must be closer cooperation between the army and the ODT: this is elementary common sense. (2) The 65,000 rail workers asked for by Col. Johnson to man the existing rolling stock must be found either in surplus-labor areas or

within the army. (3) Ports other than New York could be used as debarkation points, and if air transport now available were pressed into service, as Senator Mead suggests, widely dispersed landing fields in the East, South, and North could serve as terminals. And finally, civilians can still cut their travel: it is a small enough contribution toward giving returning veterans a break. ✕

SOME MEN BY THEIR VERY EVIL SERVE THE good. Such a man, perhaps, is Senator Bilbo. The advocates of white supremacy, of Anglo-Saxon superiority, have employed all manner of specious devices to conceal the twisted quality of mind and soul behind their racial bias. Not so Bilbo—and perhaps we should be grateful. Starkly, without shame, and with no hint of camouflage he parades his ignorant contempt for the Negro, the Jew, the Italian, for all to see. When you look at Bilbo, listen to his words, read his letters, you find yourself confronted suddenly with the incarnation of evil. He is no more a representative of Southern democracy than he is of Northern democracy. He is Exhibit A of what free Americans have been fighting against throughout their history. Bilbo is a one-man chamber of horrors, an unanswerable argument in favor of elimination of an obscene evil from a society of free men.

## Negrín on Labor's Victory

Mexico City, July 30  
(By wire to The Nation)

*"I applaud every act which strengthens the bonds of friendship between the British and Spanish people and which, in the early future, will link even more closely the Spanish Republic and the United Kingdom. From the very first day of the Spanish war the Labor Party and the British labor movement as a whole understood perfectly the universal meaning of the Spanish struggle and did everything in their power to support the legitimate regime. Had Labor been in power at the time, the outcome of our struggle would have been different. Even after the war's end and the recognition of the rebel government by the great powers, British socialism persisted in an unyielding hostility towards the totalitarian regime imposed upon the Spanish people by the now-defeated Axis. Now the road is open for an era of intimate collaboration between Spain and the British nation as soon as a constitutional regime is reestablished in my country. As a Socialist I am convinced that the Labor victory will immensely strengthen socialist and progressive forces the world over, and that its effects will manifest themselves in the internal and foreign policies of the countries of western and Mediterranean Europe. As Premier of the government of the Spanish Republic, I can say no more without unduly intruding into the internal affairs of a friendly country. Because of its historic and geographical position, and as the first country to lead the fight against fascism, Spain is destined to be an important bridge between the countries of Europe and of the American continent."*

JUAN NEGRIN

## Revolution by Ballot

THE British people knew what they wanted—a different kind of government to build a different kind of Britain—and they went after it in a highly practical way. Before the votes were counted it had been feared that the general election might produce a stalemate. With three major parties in the field, as well as numerous minor groups, it seemed quite possible that no one party would gain a working majority in the House of Commons. The electorate, however, thrust the minorities aside, reestablishing the two-party system on a more solid basis than in any election since 1908 when the Labor Party first emerged at Westminster. In spite of a considerable popular vote, the Liberals were crushed. Historically they had been the party of the middle class, but in this election the middle class joined the working class in backing the Labor Party, giving it, for the first time, truly national status.

Refusal to become entangled in the snares of a multi-party system is one sign of the political maturity of the British; another is the recognition that a leader incomparable in war was likely to prove insufferable in peace. Admiration and gratitude for Mr. Churchill remain strong but the voters knew they could not take him without his party. The Tories sought to submerge their record beneath the Churchillian victory smile; they attempted to make the election a personal popularity contest. But the people wanted no Führer, even if he bore the magic name of Churchill.

By using their votes purposefully, Britons have set an example to the world and have helped to revive faith in democracy. They have shown that governments can be overthrown by ballots even more effectively than by bullets. They have served notice on the vested interests that they demand radical changes in the British economic system. In 1945, as in 1832 and 1688, they have effected a revolution, all the more impressive because it is a bloodless one.

We speak of revolution without any thought that socialism will blossom in Britain overnight. Indeed, it will be well if friends of British Labor, at home and abroad, keep their expectations on a sober level. Clement Attlee and his colleagues inherit a full load of difficulties and it would be unfair to hope for too much too soon. Left governments in the past have often suffered more from the tendency of their followers to pass from over-optimism to disillusion than from the malice of their opponents. Let us, therefore, remember that politics is the art of the possible and not set utopian standards for the new Cabinet.

Before the Labor Party's domestic goals can be reached, many obstacles have to be overcome. "We have a job," said Mr. Attlee in his first statement after the election results were announced, "to build up in this country the highest standard of life that we can achieve for all." But Britain's wealth has been drained by the war and, until it has been replenished, there can be little hope of improving living standards on a broad scale. A large part of the nation's resources must be directed into exports, so that funds may become available to buy essential imports, and to put into rebuilding and improving capital equipment. That means consumption must be discouraged by the continuation of rationing and

other wartime controls; it means taxes, even on small incomes, must remain high.

We do not doubt, however, that the new Labor government will push steadily ahead with the great program of social reform which has been mapped out in Britain during the war years. Although this program was indorsed by the Tories, we expect that they will seek to stymie it when it takes actual legislative form. Moreover, it will probably prove impossible to tackle such problems as housing without a direct attack on the vested interests of the landowners. At least partial nationalization of the land appears to be an essential step, if the crying demand for homes is to be met expeditiously. But such a step is almost certain to bring the Labor government into conflict with the strongly Conservative House of Lords, which retains the power to delay, though it cannot finally block, bills passed by the Commons.

The domestic policies of the new government will be of vital interest to America, as conservative commentators like Arthur Krock have instantly recognized. Successful measures taken at Westminster to promote economic welfare cannot but influence the course of legislation in this country. Immediately, however, we are more concerned with British Labor's foreign policies. During the election a great deal was said about "continuity of foreign policy," and Conservative spokesmen charged that if Labor won it would upset the international apple-cart. This was merely campaign rhetoric. The foreign policy of any country is continuous in so far as it corresponds to certain fundamental national interests. Thus Britain, under Labor direction, will certainly continue to collaborate closely with the United Nations. It will carry on the war against Japan—that was immediately made clear—and will give full support to the San Francisco Charter. No great country has a bigger stake in future peace, for to none would another war so surely bring disaster.

Again, Britain depends on foreign trade, not merely to prosper but to survive, and the safeguarding of its commerce must be a major objective of any British government. Labor, therefore, will not hasten to liquidate the Empire with which Britain's economic links are so close and vital. But we may expect a new emphasis on self-government, a speeding-up of the process of evolution from colony to commonwealth, a clearer realization that imperial trade ought to be on the basis of partnership and that higher standards of living must be achieved throughout the Empire as well as at home.

Similarly, while the main lines of policy in regard to Europe are likely to be unaltered, there is reason to hope for a complete change in methods. Any British government must concern itself with the security of the home island and of imperial communications. More than ever, Britain must seek to prevent domination of western Europe, from whose shores London has so recently been bombarded, by any aggressive power. That means closer political and economic relations with its continental neighbors, and the Labor government seems to be in a far better position to promote such ties than its predecessor. For the Tories, blinded by class interest, have tended to lose sight of national interests. Using their influence to protect property and privilege on the Continent and to thwart the leftward trend, they have succeeded only in raising suspicion and irritation.

British Tory policy has been particularly unrealistic in the Mediterranean, where Churchill sought to guard the imperial life-line with a phalanx of reactionary governments. Now we may expect an early break with Franco, whose tottering throne shook with the news of British Labor's victory. In Italy, too, democracy will surely get its chance unimpeded by Churchillian attempts to salvage a corrupt monarchy. Above all in Greece, we hope to see a sharp reversal of the policies which put fascism back in the saddle to carry out a savage reign of terror against republicans, democrats, and socialists. Only through the rise of stable, popular governments in these countries can Britain's legitimate interests in the Mediterranean be safeguarded. Dictators are always untrustworthy allies.

The British Labor Party never was tainted by any sympathy for fascists. Against their poisonous doctrines it stood firm when many British Tories fawned on Hitler and praised Mussolini to the skies. Now it has a powerful mandate to complete a victory, only half won by the downfall of the Axis, by basing its foreign policy squarely on democratic principles. The eyes of the common people everywhere are upon it; it must not fail them.

## *Enemies of the Charter*

THE ratification of the United Nations Charter in the United States Senate by an all-but-unanimous vote was blanketed by even more momentous events in other parts of the world. But it, too, marks a major turning point. For it proclaims officially the decision of the American people to assume their full responsibilities as citizens of a great world power. This is how the people of other countries will take the vote in the Senate, and this is its real significance. The absence of open opposition, so startling in contrast to the fierce battles of twenty-six years ago, reflects the change in the mood of the country. It does not mean, unfortunately, that isolationist Senators are, as a breed, extinct; they are merely circumspect. They know that isolationism is at its lowest ebb and they are not disposed to risk their necks by appealing to it at this stage. With two exceptions, the isolationists voted to ratify the Charter. The result is a true reflection of the temper of the country and a somewhat distorted reflection of opinion in the Senate. The victory for international responsibility is a genuine one; but the battle is not over. It will take vigilance and high morale to prevent the opponents of world organization from whittling away the value of the victory later on. To get a clear picture of the strategy of the opposition—and to understand the vote itself—it is necessary to glance back at last week's debate.

Senator Connally opened with an elaborate and rather dramatic presentation of the Administration's position, recalling the "conflict that raged here in this chamber" in 1919 "where the League of Nations was done to death." He was followed by Senator Guffey and Senator Vandenberg, both supporting the Charter. Not a word was spoken in opposition. Then Senator Fulbright got up and expressed the uneasy feeling that must have pervaded the chamber. He wondered whether the apparent unanimity of opinion reflected "the true convictions of this body" and suggested

that perhaps the opponents of the Charter were waiting to make their fight not on ratification but on the question of the power of the American delegate on the Council and the areas in which American troops could be used.

During the second day's debate Senator Wheeler announced his intention to vote for the Charter in a forty-four-page address devoted almost entirely to its weaknesses. And he admitted that he intended to delay his real attack until the military agreements came up in the Senate, announcing baldly that "Charter ratification is only a blind for the real fight ahead—and I want to go on record as saying that there will indeed be a fight in the future, a real fight." But in revealing his strategy Wheeler also partly stymied it, for Hatch broke into his monumental address to demand that "if anybody has any objections or reservations to the Charter, let them be offered now; let it be fought out now." So the issue was in the fire.

The supporters of the Charter argued that ratification involved acceptance of Article 43, which provides that "all members of the United Nations . . . undertake to make available to the Security Council on its call, and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces . . . for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." The agreements referred to would merely fix the exact numbers and types of the forces and facilities to be made available. Wheeler argued that such a commitment would "take the power away from Congress, and the President [could] send troops all over the world to fight battles everywhere." The American people, he said over and over, would never accept such a policy.

The showdown was useful if only because it brought the opposition out of ambush and indicated what sort of attack the Charter must still face. It did not reveal the strength of the isolationist forces, since Senator Wheeler conducted the skirmish alone. The danger is that the present widespread demand for active American participation in world affairs will have simmered down by the time the military agreements are presented, perhaps a year hence. Then, if Europe is still politically unsettled and unity among the big powers is still only a hope, Senator Wheeler and his cohorts may be able to win enough converts to defeat a proposal to give the American delegate on the Council power to act. This is obviously the combination of factors he is banking on; and this is why he insisted that the military agreements should be ratified by two-thirds vote of the Senate rather than by a majority of both houses. The President's message from Potsdam announcing that the agreements will be submitted "to Congress" was, of course, a direct answer to the Wheeler maneuver. We hope it will prove a conclusive one.

Many people have attacked the new security organization for its lack of effective power. The veto provisions in particular have been criticized as a means to maintain intact the full sovereign rights of the Big Five. And that is what they are. But if Senator Wheeler has his way, the United States will supplement the veto power of its representative on the Council with the power of Congress to neutralize the Council's action against an aggressor. The defenders of the Charter and of America's responsibility in the world have done well to expose the Senator's intentions. It remains to be seen whether they have also defeated his plans.

## Japan's Choice

THE tremendous air and sea bombardment of Japan of the past two weeks has already altered the situation to such an extent that the position of the enemy in the Far East is ceasing to be comparable with that of Germany before D-day and is approximating to that obtaining after the liberation of France and Belgium and before the crossing of the Rhine." This estimate by *Veritas*, war commentator of the British Information Services, was made before the latest smashing blow to the remnant of the Jap fleet, and before the American Twentieth Air Force began to make good its promised B-29 raids on eleven specified Japanese cities.

To this enemy, already badly mauled and facing the imminent assault of the greatest military force ever assembled, the governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain offered an ultimatum: unconditional surrender or "prompt and utter destruction." If the first alternative were chosen, Japan would be disarmed, its military caste broken, its sovereignty restricted to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku, along with certain minor islands, its war criminals brought to stern justice. But the Japanese would not be "enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation." They would be left sufficient industry to support their economy but not to make war; their rights to free speech, free religion, free thought would be restored. Japan would be occupied but only long enough to insure that "there is being established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government."

Now this ultimatum is more than a demand to an enemy government to surrender. It falls just short of being a challenge to a people to revolt. That there is deep war-weariness in Japan and deep discontent with the militarists in power is evident from recent propaganda to the home front. *Veritas* quotes General Kanji Ishiwaru who, after repudiating the notion that military leaders should have a dominant peacetime role, asserts that the Japanese people "must have absolute freedom of press, freedom of speech, and freedom to form associations. . . . Since the outbreak of the China affair we have been having too much officially inspired speech and journalism." Such a statement reflects the military's loss of prestige, arising from uninterrupted defeats, and the growth of popular unrest. It is a situation we must exploit. The ultimatum fails to do so because it fails to drive a sharp wedge between the Japanese people and their rulers.

The ultimatum calls for the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest." Does this mean the "moderates" among the industrialist *Zaibatsu* who are looked on with special favor by our State Department and who, as Laurence Salisbury pointed out two weeks ago in *The Nation*, have been involved up to their necks in Japan's war ambitions? Mr. Grew would hardly admit that they were meant. Does it mean the elimination of the Emperor? We very much doubt it. John Embree in a new book, "The Japanese Nation," declares that the "irony of the present situation is that the American government,

apparently accepting the present role of the Emperor at Japanese face value, permits no propaganda to Japan that might undermine his prestige; and in the event of an occupation of Japan, our military government officers will undoubtedly, in the name of law and order, repress a revolution which might affect the imperial position." The recently revived myth of the divinely descended, divinely appointed Emperor is one of the cleverest devices of the war lords to divert the minds of the masses from social and political revolt to a mystic belief in imperishable national destiny. Our bombs are already shaking that belief. If the Imperial Palace were brought squarely into our propaganda—as well as aerial and

naval—bombsights, the Japanese people might understand that when we spoke of democracy we meant democracy.

As we might have expected, the Tokyo government turned down the Potsdam ultimatum. Militarists are not in the habit of signing their own death warrants even if their refusal calls for the destruction of their nation. But the militarists of Tokyo may not have the last say. It is our obligation, in order to hasten the end of the war, to talk directly to the Japanese people, making it unmistakably clear that surrender will bring them not only release from war but also the chance to win the free life which, heretofore, Emperor, militarists, and industrialists have denied them.

## Labor, Vets, and Jobs

BY CHARLES G. BOLTE

[Mr. Bolté, The Nation's military critic, joined the British army before Pearl Harbor and fought as a lieutenant under General Montgomery. He was wounded at El Alamein, and is now chairman of the American Veterans Committee.]

IT IS probably true to say that full employment is now accepted as the major goal of American domestic policy after the war, and that a majority of our citizens are prepared to have their government assume responsibility for seeing to it that this goal is reached. However, the schizoid personality of machine-age man being what it is—noble vision, feeble achievement—it is also true that many of our citizens are wondering whether we can do it. Consequently there is a general business of looking around for the air-raid shelter, and plenty of effort to make sure that the job will be there for Number One—just in case. And the two behemoths of the modern industrial era, organized capital and organized labor, are weighting their sandbags against the day when peace breaks out and they start in earnest to belabor each other over which gets the major cut of a pie they are afraid may grow smaller and smaller instead of bigger and bigger. In this impending mêlée it could turn out that the guy who made it all possible—the man with the gun who beat off the enemies of the Republic—will get the short end of a very dirty stick.

The facts are simple. Twelve million of the nation's healthiest young men, normally a considerable segment of the labor force, are engaged elsewhere. Already in something more than a trickle, and before long in a flood, they are going to be looking for jobs. Only about 20 per cent of them have a legal right to reemployment. The other 80 per cent will begin asking hard questions very quickly if they can't get jobs themselves. An appreciable sector of American management is preparing to cash in on the situation by using the veterans to smash organized labor. An appreciable sector of American labor is reluctant to let the veterans move in and get some of the gravy if it involves any loss to themselves. The Congress of the United States, having passed a law which is subject to an astonishing variety of interpretations, is showing no inclination to clarify the situation. Pressed for an answer, any one of these groups (pos-

sibly excepting some management quarters) will say: "The only solution is full employment." Check. But what happens during reconversion? We probably won't get full employment all at once; and while we're waiting, who's going to get the pay-envelopes?

As potential allies in this struggle for power and jobs, veterans are being wooed assiduously from all sides. It is a vital battle: the stakes are very high. What are the bare bones of the problem?

The trouble started, as is usually the case, long ago. In 1940 Congress passed the Selective Service Act. At the insistence of the labor unions, it wrote into the act Section 8, which specified that any person called for military training who "has left or leaves a position other than a temporary position" shall be restored to that position, "or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay," if he "is still qualified to perform the duties of such position" and applies for it within forty (later amended to ninety) days of his discharge from the armed forces, "unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; . . . and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration."

That seemed fair enough. You got drafted for a year and came back to the old job just as if you'd never been away. But what happened? Pearl Harbor. The "national emergency" went on for five, six, seven years. And in 1944, *four years after passage of the act*, the Selective Service System issued Local Board Memorandum 190-A, setting forth its ideas of what Congress meant when it wrote the act. Declaring himself interpreter as well as administrator of the act, Major General Lewis Hershey said that any man who replaced a man already drafted was in a "temporary" job, and was therefore not entitled to protection under the act if he was subsequently drafted himself; and, further, that the word "*position*" in the act meant *the specific job* a man was drafted from, so that when he returns he must be restored to that specific job "or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay"—even if it means discharging a worker with greater seniority.

Now see the results of 190-A: an aircraft factory has eleven workers drafted off a single punch press. Only the

first worker has a right to a job. Even if he doesn't take it—and many veterans say they won't return to their old jobs—none of the others has any right to it. Meanwhile the riveting department has been cut back and many old riveters have gone into the punch press department. The first man drafted from the punch press, who had six months in the plant and two years in the army, comes back. The old riveters have at least eight years' seniority; one of them—could be the union committeeman—has twelve. He is discharged to make room for the veteran. At the end of the year guaranteed in the act, the veteran is thrown out because he now has a total of only three and a half years' seniority, and the old riveter is rehired.

The American Legion has strongly endorsed 190-A, and a Federal Circuit Court has upheld this interpretation of the act. The unions, naturally, have howled murder. They say that a man is entitled under the act to "the totality of job rights" he would have had if he had never been taken into the armed forces, and therefore that an employer cannot reemploy a veteran if it means laying off a non-veteran with greater seniority. They point out that if their interpretation of the act is correct it will be possible to do away with Selective Service's artificial definition of the term "temporary position" and to treat any worker who joined the armed forces as a permanent employee entitled to protection under the act unless he was specifically hired on a temporary basis. The War Labor Board and an arbitrator have held that this interpretation of the act is correct.

Thus confusion is complete, and no one—veteran, employer, or worker—knows either his rights or his duties. The result is that the veteran "is in danger of finding himself in a law court rather than in a job," as the current *Bulletin* of the American Veterans Committee points out. This new organization, comprising veterans and servicemen of the current war, has therefore just called on Congress to amend the act "in such a way that all parties concerned know precisely what their rights are."

The American Veterans Committee objects to 190-A because it gives too many veterans too little and too few veterans too much ("the first man who took the job has more rights than he would have had if he had never gone into the armed forces"). In addition, A. V. C. says, "under the present law the disabled veteran has little chance of reemployment, since he is required to be able to perform the duties of his old job." A. V. C. therefore recommends amendment of Section 8 to provide for reinstatement of a veteran on the basis of seniority, including time in uniform, on a plant-wide basis, with automatic upgrading and "a rate of pay equal to or better than that received by him before he entered the armed forces." For veterans who came from establishments not using the seniority system—which would include banks, offices, shops, etc.—"the new legislation should provide that any veteran employee who was not hired on a specifically temporary basis must be reemployed in a position equal in pay to or better than the one which he had before he went into the armed forces."

In other words, more veterans would have reemployment rights, but no veteran would get more rights than he would have had if he'd never been drafted. Any veteran who was drafted out of a job would be assured one at least as good

in the old establishment, provided that the employer was employing at least as many people as he was when the veteran was drafted.

What about the millions of veterans who were drafted straight from school or college or their own businesses or the ranks of the unemployed—the bulky remainder of that 80 per cent? They have absolutely no statutory rights to jobs. In an effort to help them make up lost time, the C. I. O. has been urging its member unions—with varying success—to bargain with management for the inclusion of a clause granting every veteran synthetic seniority for his time in service, *once he's been hired*. (The United Automobile Workers, C. I. O., put this clause into its contract with Packard, and it proved itself for five hundred veterans who would otherwise have been laid off during a cutback. Some local unions are not buying it; most of management is very definitely not buying it.)

The major auto companies have countered with proposals that no one hired since May 1, 1940, shall have any seniority whatsoever; Ford has offered to lay off any worker in the plant to make room for a veteran. The three major veterans' organizations of the last war—the Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Disabled American Veterans—have proposed that seniority for time in service be imputed for purposes of new employment, with the proviso that no one presently working be laid off to make room for a veteran, unless the lay-off is ninety days or more.

The unions are certainly not buying any of these. The motor-company proposals are obviously preposterous; the veterans' organization proposal would make it too easy, the unions say, for management to close a strong union department for ninety days, then replace the whole department with veterans carefully screened for their union sentiments.

This is a nice dilemma, in which management has all the better of it from a public relations viewpoint: they appear truly patriotic, giving "the boys" everything; while the unions are, as usual, the ogres holding onto their ill-gotten gains. Obviously the only satisfactory solution is full employment: to which end the unions and the veterans' organizations, in common with most Americans, are now working. The dilemma remains: during transitional unemployment, do some of the men who have borne the brunt of the war go on relief, in which case they may move into some Gerald L. K. Smith's camp, or do some of the war workers go out, in which case organized labor may be weakened?

A subcommittee on seniority of the A. V. C. has thrown out to the members the following *faute de mieux* solution: Let there be legislation or adoption of a contract clause granting synthetic seniority for their time in uniform to veterans seeking new employment. Thus a veteran with three years in service could if necessary replace a worker with less than three years' seniority. To prevent arbitrary lay-offs of "undesirable" employees, let the worker with the least seniority be laid off. Further to prevent lay-offs aimed at affecting union strength, let every union plant official have super-seniority with respect to the synthetic seniority of any veteran. Limit the veteran's use of this synthetic seniority to one job; and limit the time after discharge in which he could exercise his rights.

Such a clause might serve to spread disorder and sorrow

a little more evenly, in case there should turn out to be disorder and sorrow. It will still not recommend itself to a good many citizens, even as an admittedly *faute de mieux* solution (significantly enough, the National Planning Committee of A. V. C. voted against accepting the subcommittee's recommendation, and A. V. C.'s New York Chapter No. 1 voted it down two to one). Nevertheless, it can be argued strongly that the veterans should be given this opportunity to catch up a little on their more favored brethren

who were allowed, perhaps even forced, to stay home. But after having said that, one must add "Amen" to the final word of the A. V. C. *Bulletin* on the subject:

The conferring of particular rights on veterans with respect to jobs will not of itself provide jobs for veterans. Only if there are jobs for all is your job assured. Full employment is the prime goal for which we must fight, for without it the special benefits of today will become the breadlines of tomorrow.


## America's Post-War Trade

BY ROBERT CHANDLER

### II.

[Robert Chandler is the pseudonym of a Washington economist. The first part of this article appeared last week.]

PROBABLY the American business man can bring enough pressure upon his own government to get it "out of business" after the war. But other governments cannot be handled in that way, and American exporters are going to find that private trade cannot be resumed on the old terms. Suppose an American firm, having cleared all the hurdles at this end, wants to ship goods to France. Private trade between France and this country has always flourished, but today France is not interested in resuming it. France agrees in principle to permit private exports to the United States provided such exports are screened, or reviewed, by a French government agency and provided the foreign exchange goes to the French government, with payment made to the French shipper in francs, not dollars. The French government keeps the dollar. France does *not* agree in principle to accept private imports from the United States.



*Countries will spend carefully their limited supply of foreign exchange.*

France has not gone Communist; it is simply facing the realities of the present situation. France must restore its economy. It must rebuild its shattered cities, its bridges, its ports. It must repair or replace its worn-out industrial equipment.

It must import raw materials in order to start its factories running. Above all, it must provide jobs and food for its people. Only by the most careful governmental planning and supervision can it hope to ration its small supply of foreign

exchange to take care of all these needs. Moreover, the French government will not permit men to carry on their former businesses if they are suspected of having been collaborationists. And, finally, in the case of many businesses, it is not known who the actual owners are. The 1939 owners may be dead, or prisoners of war, or refugees, or in French prisons.

At every turn the French government must decide what need is most urgent. Shall it import leather shoes or leather belting for industry? Shall it sell the West African peanut crop to the United States and acquire dollars or keep the peanuts for the vital health needs of the French people, whose diet has been deficient in fats and oils for four long years? How much coal should France import, and how many pitprops which will allow French coal mines to be reopened? The French government cannot allow the individual trader to decide these things. For some time after the war whatever France buys from the United States will be bought by a government purchasing mission, and possibly, the procedure will be permanent.

Government bulk purchasing is a fighting phrase to the American business man. He thinks of it as an instrument to turn the world into one gigantic Socialist experiment. It is not; but, even if it were, what could we do about it? We have accepted the Russian system of government-controlled trade, and if other nations develop the same or a similar system, we shall have to accept that, too.

If much of our trade with Europe—which, with the British Empire, used to take between 60 and 70 per cent of our exports—must exist in a misty mid-region between private trade and "socialism"—can we not do business, on our own terms, with South America? Can we not take over the trade the Germans have lost? Perhaps—if we meet certain conditions. In our biggest year before the war our exports to South America amounted to around \$700,000,000—a far cry from the billions which are talked about today. Though the Latin American countries have acquired fairly large dollar balances during the war, largely from our procurement programs, they are naturally interested in knowing how much the United States will buy when the need for critical raw materials lessens. At the Conference in Mexico City Assistant Secretary Clayton took up this point and said he thought the United States would stockpile critical materials. He could not say

definitely that it would do so, for the decision would have to be made by Congress.

The Germans, whose trade we wish to capture, were wiser than we have hitherto shown ourselves. A German trader who went into a South American country to sell his goods always looked around for some local product he could buy. A German chemical company, for example, encouraged a group of men in one country to produce rotenone—an important drug used in insecticides. When we entered the war, government representatives found that we had to have rotenone and so we began to develop its production—but as a governmental project. Will the private trader continue the practice? Some of them will, no doubt, but will enough do so to build up our



*German traders selling goods always looked around for some local product to buy.*

imports to a point where South America can buy from us? If the government buys raw materials for stockpiling, as Mr. Clayton suggested, the government will certainly be remaining in business.

Mr. Clayton recognized that the United States will have to import if it expects to export, but the remarks of most business men and government officials do not indicate any keen awareness of this fact. England must export so that it can import the raw materials it requires for its domestic economy. We must import so that foreign countries can buy from us. At the present moment, however, we seem to be making very few plans for increasing our imports, or, what is even more important, for persuading the country that we must increase them. We are accustomed to import certain basic materials—coffee, tea, rubber, cocoa, many fats and oils, most of the ferro-alloys, burlap—but we shall have to buy more than we did prior to this war if we are to sell goods abroad and permit our debtors to pay interest and principal on our loans. We could use lumber and wood products to conserve our present depleted supplies, but there is no evidence that their admission would be approved by Congress. In fact, producers of raw materials are likely to combine in a demand for even higher tariffs. Our wool growers, for instance, are already worried over the competition of synthetic fibers and of Australian wool, which can now undersell American wool even with the thirty-four-cent tariff.

All this adds up to a dangerous situation. For a time a foreign country can pay for what it imports with gold, itself a commodity, but the supply of gold is fairly limited. In the end it must pay by selling other goods, pay for shoes, for example, with wood pulp. There is no other way of doing business. We have come to feel that we made a serious mistake in not entering the League of Nations after the last war, and we are anxious to rectify that mistake. But our economic blunders after the last war were quite as serious. In fact, it might be argued that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and our insistence upon collecting the debts caused greater damage than our failure to join the League. They certainly led other nations to adopt economic policies which led to restriction of trade, depression, the rise of Fascism and Nazism, and finally

war. It will not be enough to join a collective-security organization if we do not mend our economic ways.


We should therefore recognize a few fundamental facts now.

1. Exports alone do not create jobs. If we lend money to other countries so that they will be able to buy our goods, and this money is never repaid, exports will prove to be the biggest boondoggle of all time. They will do more than other made work. Unless exports contribute to the free flow of trade throughout the world—as any kind of buying and selling does within a country—they simply mean subsidizing one group of workers in this country, and in a foreign country, at the expense of the taxpayers.

2. If we wish to create this free flow of trade throughout the world, we shall have to take thought about how to add to our imports, and this will involve, for us as for other countries, some over-all planning. If private imports are not large enough to cover exports plus service charges on loans, the government will have to step in and increase imports by various devices—stockpiling of strategic materials, encouraging exporters to develop and procure imports which will fit into their own business, encouraging Americans to use the special products of other countries, such as Oriental rugs, foreign pottery and glass, and the like. This will require considerable readjustment in our domestic production, but if we wish to develop international trade, we shall have to make the readjustment. As a matter of fact, after England passed the Peel Act in 1844 insuring free trade, its domestic manufactures prospered, even in competition with imported foreign products. If our domestic producers prove unable to compete with an imported product, it will be cheaper and more politic to subsidize the domestic producer while he changes over to another line than to continue indefinitely to subsidize, through tariffs or other devices, an essentially uneconomic system.

3. In the modern world of technology the prosperity of one nation depends on the prosperity of all nations. When we consider the devastation caused by the war, the terrible lack of

*The prosperity of one nation depends on the prosperity of all nations.*



goods all over the world, the prospects for peace-time trade seem so immense that there should be room for us all. But not if we all start out by erecting barriers. Not if we refuse to accept, in the interest of peace, a minimum of the planning which we have accepted in the interest of winning the war.

We know these things, but we are not translating our knowledge into action. The public needs to be educated about, say, the relation of bauxite production here and abroad to our economic well-being quite as much as it needs to be educated about the problems of international security. We are talking about exports but failing to emphasize the special problems of export allocations, of foreign-government controls, of importing, and similar matters—all things of tremendous importance to the peace and prosperity of the world.

# Leopold III: Traitor or Patriot?

BY JEAN E. GROSFILS

[Mr. Grosfils, a Belgian journalist, is editor of the Brussels newspaper, La Cité Nouvelle. The recent vote in the Belgian Parliament supporting Prime Minister Achille Van Acker's stand against the King gives particular point to this cabled dispatch.]

Brussels, July 25.

IT IS difficult for a Belgian to discuss the question of the King without letting passion overrule sane judgment. I shall, however, try to present it as objectively as possible and not allow personal feelings to color my interpretation.

Belgium has a constitutional monarchy—that is, the powers of the King are strictly limited. The President of the United States enjoys much greater powers than a Belgian King. When Albert I, the great King who ruled during the first World War, died, February 19, 1934, in a mountain accident, his son Leopold III became his successor and ascended the throne February 23. The sympathy of the Belgian people went out to the young King. His father had been a great national hero with an international reputation, and it was felt that a heavy task faced the thirty-three-year-old monarch. A little more than a year after his accession Leopold's wife, Queen Astrid, was killed in an automobile accident in Switzerland. Young, pretty, generous, and unpretentious, Astrid had been adored by the Belgians. The people felt a deep pity for the King and his three young children in their bereavement. Astrid became a veritable cult with the Belgian people, a part of the national tradition.

In the two years preceding the outbreak of the war the King's acts occasioned bitter debate. For example, he granted amnesty to the Belgian traitors of the first World War, who later returned to Belgium. One of these, a Dr. Martens, was awarded an honorary position after he had been pardoned.

Then, in October, 1936, the King spoke in favor of the Cabinet's policy of reasserting Belgium's neutrality. This action took place when collective security was being considered as the one safeguard against aggression. The King's decision was received with mixed emotions. Certain elements, especially the Walloons, who were sentimentally attached to France, criticized him. But the majority of the people—represented in both branches of Parliament—approved his action or made no open protest.

In the months preceding the German invasion of Belgium the King as commander-in-chief of the army remained very popular. It is true that certain elements, chiefly in the middle class, complained that the King surrounded himself with incompetent advisers; they pictured him as authoritarian, and claimed that he gave his friends special powers to the detriment of the high command. But on May 10, 1940, when the Germans attacked, all criticism of the King ceased. The Belgians, with memories of 1914, rallied behind the son of Albert I. The campaign lasted just eighteen days. The army, ill-prepared for defense—Belgium has a population of only eight million—fought valiantly. Pushed back to the sea with-

out any hope of bettering the situation, the King capitulated. One remembers the storm of criticism evoked abroad, especially in France, by the news of the capitulation. But in the years that have passed, the King has been largely cleared of the calumnies uttered at that time. No one now questions seriously the necessity of the King's action or suggests that it represented a breach of loyalty to his allies.

At the time of the capitulation his ministers begged the King to leave the country with the government, continue the fight from abroad, and make the Belgian Congo the center of the renewed war effort. Remnants of the Belgian army were still in France. It was possible, many reasoned, to reorganize them and send them once more into battle. Despite his ministers' entreaties, the King was obdurate and decided to remain in the country. The government fled to France and later to England. In Belgium the decision of the King brought sharp criticism from some, praise from others. In London the ministers dropped the discussion, and slowly the breach, at least on the surface, was healed. The Belgian people themselves, tortured and oppressed, organized resistance against the Germans. The King was a prisoner in a castle near Brussels, and the Belgians considered it indecent while they were under the heel of the enemy for anyone to discuss his actions.

From time to time, however, unfavorable rumors spread. The King often left his residence with the permission of the Germans. He had gone abroad and conferred with Hitler in Berchtesgaden. He was even willing to form a government while the country was occupied. Most Belgians refused to believe these rumors. But now it appears that they had some substance. Prime Minister Achille Van Acker, in his recent testimony before Parliament, presented documentary evidence that the King had taken a German victory for granted and had therefore failed to take strong military measures: that he had expressed disapproval of Belgian soldiers who crossed the lines to serve with the Allies after their country was occupied, and finally that he had discussed with Hitler the possibility of a *modus vivendi*, with himself on the throne, after the war. Foreign Minister Henri Spaak read extracts from former Prime Minister Pierlot's memorandum of May 25, 1940. The King was asked what he planned to do if the Germans overran the whole country. He replied, "I don't know. But I can save the people some suffering. In any case the cause of the Allies is lost."

Toward the close of 1942 the King announced through Cardinal Van Roey, Primate of Belgium, that he had married a young Belgian woman, Miss Baelis. The announcement created a sensation. Few approved the conduct of the King. People found it difficult to approve the marriage of a Monarch who had said: "I remain in the country to share the fate of the prisoners of war." Were the soldiers in the German prison camps getting married? In addition, the bride's father was open to criticism. It was rumored that at the time of the invasion he had abandoned his post as governor of a Belgian province. Finally, the marriage served to bring the royal

question to the fore again while the country was occupied by the enemy; it brought into the open an old issue which had been a source of national disunity.

During the occupation the Germans, as everyone expected, violated all international laws. Young men and women were forcibly carried off to Germany to work, with resulting misery to themselves and their families. Some believed that in view of the conduct of the Boches the King should have cast aside his silent role and spoken out. The protest he eventually made was much too feeble, in the opinion of those engaged in the resistance movement.

But, while criticizing the King, the vast majority of the people were far from suspecting that his actions might some day raise the question of abdication. In September, 1944, Brussels was liberated. Soon the government returned to the capital. The chambers met, and under the Constitution had to name a regent since the King was not available. The King's brother Charles was chosen by an overwhelming majority, a fact which gave some indication of the Belgians' passionate devotion to the institution of the monarchy. Later the King announced that his health would not permit his return to Brussels and requested his brother to remain as regent. But by mid-June of this year the King reported such a notable improvement in his health that he was in a position to come back at once. This news brought on the political crisis which still continues. The world press has carried a full account of the King's negotiations with individuals inside Belgium and I shall not repeat the story. In the past three months he has consulted and questioned all the representative Belgian leaders. Meanwhile the chief political parties have taken their official stand. The right favors the return of the King; the left is for abdication.

Many favoring the King's return argue that he did not act wrongly and that most of the criticism is calumny. They contend that once liberated the King should come right back to Belgium and resume his reign. In addition, many of those less favorably disposed to the King have supported him, fearing that his abdication would be the first step toward a republic. The vast majority of Belgians favor the monarchy because the country is split by language and religion. The King's supporters argue that the campaign against him is directed by the Communists bent on destroying the country's strength. The partisans of the King are mainly among Catholics, rightists, the wealthy classes, farmers, and the inhabitants of the Flemish-speaking areas.

Among those who favor abdication many contend that the regent is performing his duties admirably. They say that the King's eldest son could be crowned and serve under the regent until he becomes eighteen. Thus the person of the King would no longer be subject to debate. The function of the King is to crystallize about his person a unanimity of national sentiment. It is argued that if this unity should become impossible, he should retire. The quarrel has reached a very bitter stage—a tragic event for the Belgians. But it is probably better at this point to probe deeply into the wound. Belgians can then form their opinions with all the facts before them. Heretofore in their history they have shown enough wisdom to rise above partisanship and adopt measures that will stand up to the searching light of truth. They can probably do it again.

## In the Wind

**CRYSTAL BALL DEPARTMENT:** George E. G. Catlin, a former Socialist candidate for Parliament, forecasting the British election results in the *Commonweal* of July 27, concluded thus: "Laski is likely to have the . . . dubious satisfaction of being known as the man whose personal vanity lost his party their electoral chances of victory in 1945."

**ADVERTISING:** A survey by the Radio Council of Greater Cleveland among middle-class people shows that nearly 80 per cent prefer to take their commercials straight, without music. In fact, 59.86 per cent said they would like to see singing commercials banned, and 71.68 per cent said they had been turned against some products by the blatant manner in which they were advertised.

**REAL ESTATE:** A Los Angeles realtor offers "a nice clean profit" in "colored property," meaning houses in Negro areas. "The real-estate boom is now nearing normal," says one of his broadsides. "Prices in certain districts are already back to normal. Get on this Gravy Train today. . . . Cash is King. Sell your old 50-year-old houses full of bugs, termites, broken plaster, not on foundations, for all cash."

**HEALTH:** A booklet advertising Lake Minnewaska, New York, contains the following item of information: "Restrictions: Christian clientele. Persons suffering from tuberculosis or other objectionable diseases not accommodated. Dogs are cared for in the stables."

**HERALDRY:** Sir Edward Grigg, former Member of Parliament for Altrincham, Cheshire, England, was recently raised to the peerage. His choice of the title Lord Altrincham was protested by six Labor aldermen and members of the Altrincham Town Council. The mayor referred the matter to the Sewage Disposal Committee, who supported Sir Edward by a vote of five to three.

**RELIGION:** This advertisement appeared in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, *Patriot* on July 21: "Tonight Only: Harold G. Palmer, redeemed Hebrew and former convict, will tell 'How Christ Saved Me.' Sponsored by Youth for Christ."

**LOST-AND-FOUND:** A Paris warehouse full of fine furniture which Hermann Goering's agents had looted from French homes and crated for shipment to Germany was taken over by the Americans, and certain pieces were sent to Versailles to furnish Allied headquarters. The French government recently tried to recover the furniture, but learned that it had followed SHAEF to Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. We will pay \$1 for each item accepted—EDITORS THE NATION.]

# BOOKS and the ARTS

## NOTES BY THE WAY

BY MARGARET MARSHALL

SEVERAL weeks ago *The Nation* printed an advertisement which was also an epitaph on a way of life.

Due to extreme age of few remaining members [it read] the famous Mt. Lebanon Shaker community property is now offered for sale. 250 acres; 3-acre lake; ski-run; woods; unsurpassed Berkshire view . . . several dormitories; 3 smaller houses; barn. Ideal for summer theater. . .

It recalled very vividly the long morning I spent at one of the other remaining Shaker colonies—somewhere in Maine. The Shakers had a penchant for high places, and the colony I visited commanded a magnificent sweep of cultivated fields falling away and far mountains rising. There were dormitories and smaller houses, and a fine little Shaker meeting house decorated in Shaker blue. Most of the remaining members were old and it was clear that the colony must vanish, but we were guided about by a young woman who seemed to have preserved intact, against all the vicissitudes of modern life, the attitudes and character and even the appearance, or so it struck me, of the veritable Shaker. Her face had an antique look about it, a look also of calm and dignity and dedication which one seldom sees in contemporary faces. The curious thing was that this young woman seemed more in character than any of the older people we met, as if in her the Shaker idea had had a new, belated, flowering. Her elucidations of Shaker history and principles obviously came out of an unswerving belief as well as extensive knowledge. As she conducted us over the grounds and through the buildings her voice and talk, her whole aspect, recreated an earlier age—in spite of the evidence all about us of the inroads of the modern world and the modern temper. These inroads were suggested by the sense of superannuation and of emptiness which hung over the place, but they were most vividly illustrated in the furnishings of the fine buildings which the Shakers knew so well how to construct. The exquisite hand-made furniture which must once have graced these rooms was gone, except for a few stray pieces, and the elderly Shaker woman sitting placidly in an ugly machine-made rocker seemed both a physical and a spiritual symbol of what had happened not only to a religious sect but to the handicraft culture in which it could flourish.

The Shaker girl, by the way, had something to say about the reasons why the members of the colonies in earlier days were such superb craftsmen. She said they worked better than others because they felt secure—for life, she meant, as well as for eternity. They belonged to a community and their livelihood was assured. The young woman's comment on this score seemed to me profound and not at all antiquated.

THE APRIL ISSUE of *Horizon* contained another instalment of Augustus John's rambling autobiography, which I find delightful partly no doubt because it is so utterly disconnected from here and now. Among many other things, he

touches upon the decline of taste among the descendants of people who were probably not even aware of the concept of taste but whose houses and furniture fulfilled all its requirements—in proportion, in texture, in workmanship. The sureness with which a New England builder, 150 years ago, constructed a beautiful house has always puzzled me. His models were good, of course, but that does not explain why his adaptations of fine models—for they were usually adaptations rather than slavish copies—were so right. I think it must have been a matter of a hand and eye trained to principles of proportion and texture and workmanship which were not merely the manifestations of an individual talent but the discipline of a prevailing culture.

To get back to Augustus John. He speaks of the difficulty of finding a room in the English countryside where he can paint. All he requires is "a simple whitewashed room, fairly lit and sparsely furnished in the plainest style." But where, he asks, is such a thing to be found? And he continues:

The village inn may be perfectly situated and its bar satisfactory, but venture upstairs to view the accommodation offered there and you are likely to return, discouraged, to the bar, before moving on. The progressive degradation of popular taste in the last hundred years has now reached its nadir and has rendered travel a process of alternate elation and defeat. Who is content to sleep, let alone wake, amidst a clutter of mean junk? . . . The productions of local industry and craftsmanship which used to dignify the humblest cottage have been looted by the antique dealers and now are seldom seen outside museums, curiosity shops, or the houses of enlightened amateurs. They have been replaced by imported articles of imitation luxury turned out in monstrous centers of mass labor here or abroad. Having sold or been done out of their birthright, the people, habituated to the ensuing squalor, end, like drug-fiends, by craving for it.

One has only to enter almost any one of those simple, beautifully proportioned New England farmhouses along the highway to discover the sad accuracy of Augustus John's remarks.

"MOVIE MONEY," by which I mean Hollywood salaries, the prices paid for movie rights, and so on, is real; yet it has always seemed to me harder to believe in than stage money. The reason is simple. The amounts bandied about are so fabulous that the imagination cannot cope with them any more than it can visualize the vast sums so casually mentioned in connection with the United States Treasury. I don't expect to have to test the reality of movie money, but I'm sure that if I were faced with the necessity I would emerge from the experience, as so many people are reputed to do, with no more actual cash than I had before. Perhaps there are people who save money in Hollywood, but the classic sequence in which the indigent writer who suddenly receives \$1,000 a week manages somehow, in spite of his good resolutions, to spend that much seems to me to represent the truth if not the fact about movie money.

The incident which has inspired these remarks has, however, a rather different point. A friend of mine, who has a reputation as a literary critic, recently received an announcement of the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Annual Novel Award, and an inquiry as to whether she would be interested in being a first reader of the manuscripts that would be submitted. Obviously she was asked only because of her reputation, and it is not surprising that as she studied the financial data set forth on page two of the announcement, she assumed that for once she might earn a fee commensurate with her qualifications. Here are the figures, in their mounting glory.

\$125,000  
Minimum to the Author  
\$175,000  
Maximum to the Author  
Contingent upon Sales  
\$25,000  
To the Publisher upon Publication  
Making a Maximum possible Total of  
\$200,000

My friend, who is only human, indicated that she might be interested and asked what the remuneration would be. The dénouement came with the telephone call the next day. The price Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer had put on the services of a literary critic well known enough to have been heard of in Hollywood was "Seven fifty." When the figures were reported to me in this form, I thought it meant that the salary for the job of a first reader in the great Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Annual Novel Award was \$750. It seemed to me adequate, though not excessive in terms of movie money. It turned out, however, that it was a matter of piece work and that Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer was expecting to get good literary critics to read manuscripts at \$7.50 each.

If the award is announced, as it is supposed to be, on August 15, we may assume that readers were found. But one of my few remaining illusions about Hollywood has been punctured. I am not surprised at Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's low estimate of the worth of literary critics. I am shocked that that great company is capable of writing a check for as little as \$7.50.

## Apologies to Vansittart

*BONES OF CONTENTION.* By the Rt. Hon. Lord Vansittart. Alfred A. Knopf. \$2.75.

**A** FEW words about the reviewer: it is good law to cross-examine the witness, and good science to measure the aberration of the instrument. The undersigned was born and bred in the most orthodox anti-Tory tradition. He has strong prejudices, which he honestly calls principles and convictions. He has in the last forty years joined three leagues advocating reconciliation with Germany, and he would gladly join a fourth now. During the two world wars and between the wars, he has worked incessantly against hatred. So what goes by the name of Vansittartism—*Delenda est Germania*—was to him an abomination. He had read in the past a few lurid samples of the noble lord's eloquence. The

case was clear: Vansittart and all his works should be obliterated.

It is the hardest thing in the world to confess an error. Germany in 1919 could be coerced, but not persuaded, to say *Peccavi*. Because we murdered the League of Nations, we still believe that the league was not fit to live. "Liberals"—Harry Elmer Barnes for twenty years, Harry Emerson Fosdick in 1939, Louis M. Boudin as late as 1945—attacked Versailles and the French policy in terms which had a Hitlerian ring: they have not apologized yet to the shade of Clemenceau, and probably they never will. Well, I too hate to acknowledge a mistake. But, to my infinite embarrassment, I found that I agreed with Lord Vansittart.

This is the first book of his that I have read in full, and I enjoyed the experience. It is written in a style which makes Westbrook Pegler's seem hesitant and flabby—but with an Eton accent. Westbrook at his Pegleriest would not quote offhand Ammanius Marcellinus and Velleius Paterculus. Vansittart's main thesis is now a commonplace, indorsed by Germany's best friends: that Germany *as a nation* is committed to a mad policy of ruthless domination. Not Hitler alone is guilty, but an ever-deepening and widening trend, from Frederick II to Bismarck, to William II, to Goebbels and Goering. I deeply regret that Vansittart is right. It would be infinitely more comfortable if he were not. But the Germans have proved him right, and I have to accept the evidence. The terms he suggests for Germany would have seemed crazy ten short years ago: tomorrow, they will be imposed by the victors, and be accepted by the rest of the world as just and moderate. There is surprisingly little difference between the essence of Vansittartism and Thomas Mann's message to the Germans\* on the day of their surrender.

We might agree, negatively, in damning the Germany that worshiped Hitler. But, the cursing over, we do not yet part company. A great point in favor of Vansittart is that he is not swayed by class prejudices. While George N. Shuster praises "the upright courteous folk, the great ladies and gentlemen to be met . . . in East Prussia," Vansittart does not spare the highest society: nobility, general staff, bureaucrats, industrialists, church leaders—he might have added university professors: Germany will not recover her sanity until she has been decapitated. The essay on The Destiny of France is a model of intelligence and generosity compared with the attitude of Smuts, Roosevelt, and the vast majority of our journalists; I wish it could be read by millions. But most of all, I appreciate his plea for international honesty. Our treatment of the smaller nations will be the *test case*. Vansittart combats, courageously, the Super-Power nonsense: according to tough and realistic William T. R. Fox, indorsed by Frederick Schuman, three "elephants" with every right, and forty-seven "squirrels" with none. "From the end of 1918 onward," says Vansittart, "the great powers made great fools of themselves. . . . I have not sufficient confidence in the wisdom of great powers to believe in the duration of a world controlled by them." "The full participation of *all* our allies in the occupation of Germany—and in the direction of all policy toward Germany—is indispensable if there is ever to be any improvement in Ger-

\* Printed in *The Nation* of May 12.

many." This chapter also I should like every American to ponder. Secret meetings of supermen—Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam—are exactly what our democracy has been fighting against. Yet there was no one to urge President Truman not to give the lie so promptly to his own promises at San Francisco. On this fundamental issue, even *The Nation* faltered.

It may be that Lord Vansittart is weak on the constructive side. He admits a Federation of Europe (who does not?) but only as a distant goal. He does not seem to realize that the most propitious time is *now*. He wants to destroy Germany, not the Germans: he does not clearly state, as Roosevelt did, that the German people (not the German nation) must be reintegrated into the European family. All negative policies lead to frustration and despair. The triumph of our might will simply deepen in the Germans their old conviction that might is right. But any plan for genuine reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation, is branded as Utopian—even if it starts with as definite a foundation as a European Zollverein and a European control of basic industries. We still believe that drifting is realistic, and steering feeble idealism. But I do not want to quarrel with Lord Vansittart about what he failed to say. With what he did say, I blush that I agree; and I tender to him my reluctant and all the more sincere apologies.

ALBERT GUÉRARD

## BRIEFER COMMENT

### Peace and Progress

ECONOMIC FATALISM, so prevalent in the last century, is rapidly disappearing in contemporary Western society. No longer do we blame God for booms and slumps; we believe that man can control his economic destiny. Consequently there is a growing demand for economic planning, but if this is to be fruitful, those who finally determine its directions—the sovereign people—must be able to understand and evaluate the schemes that economists draft and politicians debate.

That is one reason why Kenneth E. Boulding's "The Economics of Peace" (Prentice-Hall, \$3.75) deserves more attention than it appears to have received. Mr. Boulding, a graduate of Oxford now teaching at Iowa State University, has deliberately adopted the role of "intellectual middleman" seeking to spread popular knowledge of "the silent revolution in economic thought" which has taken place in the past few decades. On the whole, he has performed admirably the task of providing a layman's introduction to Keynesian thought. Unlike most economists, he writes extremely well; he is clear, interesting, and sometimes witty. Unfortunately, he also betrays a touch of scholastic arrogance which ill becomes the student of so empirical a science as economics.

The book is divided into two sections—The Economics of Reconstruction and The Economics of Reform. In the first, Mr. Boulding reviews Europe's experiences after the last war, reminding us how reconstruction "was hampered constantly by the desire to 'return' to the golden age of 1913." That kind of nostalgia is less in evidence today; 1939 does not appear glamorous in retrospect. Consequently there may

be a better chance to tackle reconstruction as part of the much vaster job of construction that faces the world.

In the second and longer section Mr. Boulding deals with the problems of distribution in advanced industrial communities, but as he does well to emphasize, it is only a minority of the world's population that is embarrassed by apparent overproduction. In most societies, the overwhelming problem is how to bring about economic progress, how to overcome chronic scarcity due not so much to exploitation as to "the sheer unproductiveness of the mass of human labor." To lift the load of poverty from Indian or Chinese backs, there must be an increase in output per head, for progress is impossible where the toil of one man barely suffices for his subsistence. This is a problem to which industrial nations, in their own interest, need to apply themselves with missionary zeal.

KEITH HUTCHISON

### Thoreau's Way

NO RENUNCIATION of the world was ever outwardly less spectacular than Thoreau's retirement to a back-yard wilderness on July 4, 1845. At the same time nothing ever more forcefully demonstrated the truth of his own later statement that no place is either more or less wild than the wildness which one imports into it. His gesture has taken hold upon the imagination to an extent completely unjustified by any of its physical aspects and during recent months there has been quite a little flurry over the one hundredth anniversary of an exploit externally a great deal less spectacular than a camping trip on Bear Mountain. Even the *Saturday Evening Post* celebrated it with an illustrated article and, less surprisingly, an exhibit was staged at the American Museum of Natural History. After reading or re-reading "Walden" itself, those who want to know more about why its author has meant so much to a great many different sorts of people can not do better than to address themselves to George F. Whicher's "Walden Revisited" (Packard, \$2). The little book is actually a general account of Thoreau's career plus an extremely acute, well-written critique of his ideas, and a more illuminating or more readable ninety-seven pages has never been written about him. Professor Whicher stops this side of uncritical idolatry but his is a thoroughly sympathetic account of one of the greatest and most stimulating of protestants. Perhaps the world has never seemed less inclined to go Thoreau's way but that is all the more reason to remind ourselves of what can be said for his protest against the assumption that Man is first of all a producer and a consumer.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

### Rush Job

THE READER WHO HAS NEED of a history of the war should not be misled by the publishers' claim that this book is the first "to survey the entire European war, each of its campaigns and all of its strategy, up to the point of the fall of Nazi Germany." "Unconditional Surrender" by Everett Holles (Howell, Soskin, \$2.50) offers only the barest account of the war up to Montgomery's recovery in North Africa and our own landing there, and is entirely unsatisfactory on the Russian campaigns. The style is a vigorous journalese of fairly high quality. The historical narrative,

somewhat confused at the outset, is enlivened—or encumbered—with ready-made, radio-type descriptions of action and that sort of characterization which consists in saying that a general is heavy-jowled. For the most part the book adds nothing to public knowledge, though here and there the author's opinions suggest that he has inside information. At other points, concerning the Arnhem disaster for example, Mr. Holles is behind the times with his explanation. Considerable disapproval of the political strategy of the war is expressed, particularly with regard to Badoglio and the Italian crown. This critical attitude, however, is not consistently maintained. The book does not come to an end but merely stops with President Truman's announcement of May 8 and Mr. Churchill's speech. Evidently "Unconditional Surrender" is a high-spirited rush job; it will give little real satisfaction to a serious reader.

RALPH BATES

## Baedeker to Bureaucracy

THE BUSINESS MAN—or anyone else for that matter—who is about to take an important post in Washington should read "Big Democracy" by Paul H. Appleby (Knopf, \$2.75). No more useful Baedeker to the bureaucracy has been written. Mr. Appleby addresses himself to the mind of government, to the kind of thinking that policymakers in federal posts must do in reaching decisions. He makes it clear that acting "in a governmental way" is different from acting privately. He tells why it must continue to be different if we are to have a democracy.

His point is not well understood. Washington holds no more tragic figure than the executive who comes with the high resolve to make his office function in the well-ordered image of the Amalgamated Widget Company. Such men always fail. And when they do they go home convinced that politics and the Great Boyg, bureaucracy, have thwarted them. Congressional and journalistic criticism seem to them interference and persecution. Questioning of policy within their agencies seems to them disloyalty and intrigue. Resistance to policy by other agencies means that the government has no over-all policy.

During his eight years as assistant to Henry Wallace and his four years as Under Secretary of Agriculture Paul Appleby learned to navigate Washington waters skilfully. Though he has left the government for private business he looks back and finds federal processes good, efficient, and well adapted to their objective. He accepts bigness, red tape, politics, a degree of conflict, the balancing of interests. He tells why he accepts them and some of the methods of dealing with them.

Special groups of readers might profit immensely from reading selected chapters of the book. Those who go to Washington on business might well read the chapter on delegation of authority to different levels within a department: their time and the time of the officials they visit would often be saved. Chamber of Commerce committees seeking field offices might study the chapter on regional decentralization: they would find, often, that their trip was unnecessary.

The extent to which Mr. Appleby draws upon the Department of Agriculture for his illustrations may dull the book for some readers. But this department is a good labor-

atory, and his conclusions are general in their application. The book is meaty and cogent: it contains no tabloid formulas or Sunday-supplement solutions to federal problems.

PHILIP S. BROUGHTON

## Science and History

DR. MORRIS ZUCKER'S two fat volumes of almost eighteen hundred pages on "The Philosophy of American History" (Arnold-Howard, \$8.50) have been hailed, according to his publishers, as "one of the truly great original achievements of our times," and as "the most profound analysis yet made of the philosophy of history," because in it "history for the first time attains the rank of a science." With these encomiums the author appears to be in full agreement. His new historical dispensation, "the Historical Field Theory," has a mixed parentage. In it, however, a Marxist strain easily predominates, while physical scientists, particularly Einstein and Maxwell, provide false analogies and terms which help confuse. In the first volume the nature of "the Historical Field Theory" is set forth, and in the second American history is rewritten in accordance with it.

This theory is, in Dr. Zucker's words, "based upon the application of scientific principles to the analysis of history." These principles are: "(1) history is the record of events in society; (2) society is an aggregate of three component divisions—the state, the economy, and the ideological superstructure; (3) the specific form of the social structure is determined by the nature of the social continuum established by the relations of these aggregates; (4) this continuum provides the matrix for the events which history records; (5) society is progressive to the extent that it permits fuller play for the difference of social potential in its creative elements during its virile state; (6) and finally that happenings of historical significance are derived from the operation

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of definite social laws which are causal in character."

If this tiresome work were less violently personal, cantankerous, prejudiced, and arrogant, the reviewer might be more inclined to commend it for even attempting to deal with theoretical questions with which few professional historians are concerned and for its occasional common-sense judgments. Throughout the two volumes Dr. Zucker conducts endless polemics against theories which meet with his disfavor, and condemns to a horrid historical death an impressive number of individuals as "lunatics" and "idiots." His substantial ignorance in the literature of the historical areas about which he fearlessly writes—ancient, medieval, modern European, and American—permits him to fashion facile generalizations, to dash off irrelevant value judgments, and to applaud his own contributions. Quite apart from other considerations, his work is all too frequently in conflict with that scientific method and spirit to which Dr. Zucker asserts exclusive ownership. "We had to destroy the lackadaisical idea," he writes, "that since this is still a free country every historian has an inalienable right to produce his own laws of social movement." **HENRY DAVID**

## MOTION PICTURES

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# Music

B. H.  
HAGGIN

GERSHWIN'S career as a serious composer was based on fallacious reasoning—as fallacious as the reasoning would have been that because Johann Strauss wrote delightful *Wiener-walzer* he was the one to write the Viennese symphony and opera, and this on the ground that only the Viennese waltz was the proper substance for the truly Viennese symphony and opera, which was to say that because the Viennese waltz expressed Viennese feeling on the emotional level of a waltz it must be used as the substance of music which expressed Viennese feeling on the level of the symphony and opera. If Strauss had acted in accordance with such reasoning he would have produced the same delightful waltzes arranged in the formal patterns of serious music; and that was the result in Gershwin's case.

His serious works are filled with characteristic and superb Gershwin show-music, pieced together in the required formal patterns with derivative and inconsequential connective material in the idiom of serious music—show-music which communicates, in these contexts and in Carnegie Hall, exactly what it would have communicated in a musical show and in the Alvin Theater. That is true of the Rhapsodies, the Piano Concerto, and "Porgy and Bess," in which there is a further fallacy to take note of. A couple of years ago Duke Ellington presented in Carnegie Hall his "Black, Brown and Beige"—described as "a tone parallel to the history of the Negro in America," and based on the idea that since the American Negro had produced jazz, jazz was the medium in which to express in musical terms everything that had happened to him from his arrival here in slavery down to his participation in the present war. If that was absurd, what is one to say of Gershwin's expressing Negro life in Broadway show-tunes and even more glaringly incongruous material in styles borrowed from opera—for example, the recitative in which Catfish Row Negroes sing such facts as that they will have to get up at five o'clock the next morning. Only in "An American in Paris" does Gershwin succeed in inventing imaginative non-show-music material—such as the opening theme—that is on the level of the show-music; also he achieves his most successful integration of material in a

continuous progression; and I find this to be the best of his ambitious works.

The occasion for this little survey is a flood of Gershwin recordings issued by Victor and Columbia to "tie in" with the film "Rhapsody in Blue." To begin with Gershwin's own "Rhapsody in Blue," Columbia offers a new recording made by Levant with the Philadelphia Orchestra under Ormandy (Set X-251; \$2.50), while Victor gives new promotion (and one of its useless 25-cent showpiece "albums") to the one made some years back by Sanroma with the Boston "Pops" Orchestra under Fiedler (Set SP-3; \$2.25). When I wrote about Levant's performance of the Piano Concerto last year I spoke of Gershwin's playing as I recalled it; now it occurred to me to get hold of the old Victor record of Gershwin's own performance of the Rhapsody (an abridged version) with Whiteman's Orchestra; and this not only confirmed my recollection of the deftness, lightness, and precision of his playing, but amplified it: in its simplicity of style the playing had an un-failing and subtle continuity of rhythm and phrasing. As against this, Levant's playing astonishes me again by its crude treatment of piano and phrase; while Sanroma, who has the sensitiveness as pianist and musician that Levant lacks, chooses to play the music in an unendurably affected style. Which brings me to this point: usually a composer must rely on performance-directions in the score to convey inadequately the form in sound that he has in mind, and the inadequate notation gives the performer an excuse for what he does with the music; but in this case there is a recorded performance by the composer which establishes unmistakably and authoritatively what he wanted the music to sound like; and there is no excuse for the extravagances of Sanroma and Fiedler, Levant and Ormandy. As for recording, the Victor version has the sound of the Boston "Pops" recordings of several years ago, which overemphasis of highs made shrill and hard and clangy; the Columbia is on the dull, wooden side.

Continuing with the collection of excerpts from "Porgy and Bess" that Robert Russell Bennett pieced together for Reiner, Columbia offers Reiner's performance with the Pittsburgh Symphony (Set 572; \$3.50), and Victor Sevitzky's with the Indianapolis Symphony (Set 999; \$3.50), which makes some cuts. Reiner's is the finer performance by miles; Sevitzky's the better recorded one by the same distance. Specifically, in the

Victor sound everything is correctly placed in space, correctly balanced, cleanly defined in absolute quiet, and sensuously beautiful; in the Columbia sound things stick out disproportionately and there is a great deal of muddy confusion.

There is even more of this muddy confusion in the recorded sound of Rodzinski's performance of "An American in Paris" with the New York Philharmonic Symphony (Set X-246; \$2.50). Remembering Toscanini's performance I find the performance only fair.


## BOOK REVIEWERS

ALBERT GUERARD, professor of comparative and general literature at Stanford University, is the author of several books, of which the latest is "Europe Free and United."

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# Letters to the Editors

## The Court's Virtues . . .

*Dear Sirs:* It is gratifying to read in Mr. Percy E. Corbett's interesting article on The Second League, in your issue of July 7, his measured statement that "the new tribunal can be expected to carry on its excellent work." Yet the article contains references to certain features of the Statute of the International Court of Justice upon which I should like to comment.

Mr. Corbett states that the new Statute "preserves the vices of the previous structure." He first refers to "the institution of *ad hoc* judges," which in his view "will be a standing impediment to the growth of a tradition of impartial detachment." As I view the record of the Permanent Court during the eighteen years of its functioning, there was no such impediment. The *ad hoc* judges were useful in two ways: they frequently enabled the Court to proceed with surer knowledge of local conditions and local usage in regard to the states before it, and they gave better assurance to the people of a losing state that their case was understood at each stage of the Court's proceedings. Moreover, the "institution" was in line with a whole century of development with respect to international adjudication. Instead of calling this feature a *vice*, therefore, I deem it a *virtue* of the old, as well as of the new Court.

A second "vice" was found in the exclusion of individuals as parties before the Court. At a time when the prime need of the world is for a court which will deal effectively with disputes between states, this seems to me a misplacing of emphasis. Neither at the meeting of the United Nations Committee of Jurists in Washington, nor at the San Francisco conference, was a proposal made by any delegate to correct these alleged "defects."

In referring to the "new rule" in Article 94 of the Charter concerning possible measures to be taken by the Security Council to insure compliance with the Court's judgments, Mr. Corbett seems to have overlooked the analogous provision in Paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the Covenant. Had he recalled the experience of the Council of the League of Nations—the provision in the Covenant was invoked only once in eighteen years—he might have saved himself the

fear that this provision in the Charter would "engender a practice of deferring satisfaction of judgment until the winning party lodges complaint with the Council," and that the "new" procedure "could develop into a political appeal over judicial decision."

During the past winter the matters discussed by Mr. Corbett were carefully considered at twenty-five regional group conferences arranged by the American and Canadian Bar Associations, and on each of them conclusions at variance with Mr. Corbett's views were reached by the American and Canadian lawyers participating. MANLEY O. HUDSON  
Cambridge, Mass., July 19

## . . . And Its Defects

*Dear Sirs:* Thank you for sending me Judge Hudson's letter concerning my article in your issue of July 7.

After reading it, I find myself still regarding as defects those provisions in the new statute which preserve the practice of appointing *ad hoc* judges, and which exclude individuals as parties before the court. The first rule perpetuates an unhappy distinction between the national and international administration of justice. The second perpetuates the limitation of international law to the rights and duties of states *inter se* and refuses the individual a protection which he increasingly needs.

As for the third point, Judge Hudson's argument based upon Paragraph 4 of Article XIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the experience, or rather lack of experience, in the application of that paragraph is probably conclusive. He is quite right in saying that I had overlooked this paragraph, and I am most grateful that his correction should be added to the record.

P. E. CORBETT

New Haven, Conn., July 21

## Beaverbrookism in Canada

*Dear Sirs:* In the article Canada Stands Pat, in your issue of June 23, Mr. Maxwell Cohen finds (in reference to the C. C. F.) that "the loss of ground during recent months is not easy to explain." He implies, however, that it is to be attributed in part to C. C. F. leaders' lack of knowledge that "this was the

world of Keynes, Beveridge, and Hansen," etc.

It strikes the writer as odd that Mr. Cohen failed altogether, in his search for an explanation, to take into account the notorious pre-election pamphlet "Social Suicide," by an advertising man named Trestrail. A good deal of publicity has been given recently to Lord Beaverbrook's methods in the British election campaign. The Trestrail pamphlet was Beaverbrookism on the lowest level; in fact, by comparison the average Beaverbrookism would probably be found to be truthful, fair, and decent.

Mr. Cohen ignores this bit of popular propaganda, presumably because he considers it unimportant. Yet practically every voter must have been introduced to Trestrail through the mails; and it would seem to be a safe speculation that only a small proportion of the six millions to whom the pamphlet was delivered in the closing weeks of the campaign had ever heard or read of Keynes, Beveridge, and Hansen, or, if they had read these names in the press, had more than the foggiest notions about what their owners stand for.

Throughout the campaign the "world of Keynes, Beveridge, and Hansen" was much less vivid in the mind of the average voter than the nether world of Trestrail.

GEORGE DUNCAN

Calgary, Alberta, July 4

## A Matter of Emphasis

*Dear Sirs:* I was much interested in Coleman Rosenberger's article Is "Freedom Road" True? in your issue of July 14. But it seems to me that Mr. Rosenberger defended Mr. Fast's thesis on those points which most historians concede, that is, the fact that the Southern aristocracy could not become reconciled to the freedom of their former slaves, with all that this implied. Mr. Fast also described the growing realization of the former slaves and the "poor whites" that their interests lay together vis-à-vis the Southern aristocracy, which desired to return to the pre-Civil War conditions. It seems to me, therefore, that Mr. Rosenberger might have devoted his time to buttressing this part of Mr. Fast's thesis by pertinent quotations rather than proving what has been proved.

MALCOLM BONDY

Brooklyn, July 15